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Abstract
We analyze mobility in urban Mexico between three labor market states: work-
ing in the formal sector, working in the informal sector, and not working. We use
a dynamic multinomial logit panel data model with random effects, explaining
the labor market state of each individual during each time period. The data is
drawn from Mexico’s Urban Employment Survey, a quarterly household survey
for urban Mexico. Two separate five-wave panels are used: the first covering a
period of rapid economic growth (1992 – 1993), the second a period of recession
after the Peso crisis (1994 – 1995).
Our main results are in line with the theory that formal sector jobs are supe-
rior to informal sector jobs and that working in the informal sector is a temporary
state for those who cannot find a formal sector job and cannot afford not to work.
Entry and exit rates for the formal sector are lower than for the informal sector.
The probability of formal sector employment strongly increases with education
level. For men, it is easier to enter the formal sector from the non-working state
than from the informal sector. The probability of working in the informal sector
decreases with the level of income of other family members, while the probability
of not working increases with it.
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1 Introduction
Urban labor markets in developing countries are generally characterized by the presence
of a large informal sector. While formal sector employment is subject to regulation,
social premiums and taxation, with wages paid on a regular basis, and explicit contracts
between employers and employees, the informal sector is not subject to institutional
regulations and mainly consists of small firms and self-employment.
The segmentation of the labor market into a formal and an informal sector has been
analyzed extensively during the last two decades. Two competing points of view on the
role of the informal sector exist. The traditional staging hypothesis in the theoretical
work of Fields (1975) is that formal sector employment is rationed. Those who cannot
obtain a formal sector job either search from unemployment, or, if they cannot afford
to be unemployed, work in the informal sector. Thus informal sector workers have
secondary jobs, and would be better off with a primary job in the formal sector. In this
view, the informal sector functions as an intermediary buffer sector between not working
and the formal sector.
The other view sees the two sectors as symmetric and competitive. The formal and
informal sector have different production functions, and heterogeneity among workers
implies that some are more productive in one sector while others have larger productivity
in the other sector. Under the assumption that unrestricted workers choose the sector
where they are most productive and can earn the highest wage, this model can be tested
using cross-section data on individual workers’ sector choice and wages, see Heckman
and Sedlacek (1985). Magnac (1991) applies an extension of this model – which also
accounts for the state of not working – to married women in urban areas in Columbia.
He finds that this model cannot be rejected, and concludes that the labor market is in
a ‘weakly competitive equilibrium.’
Other empirical evidence on sector choice and wage differentials between formal and
informal sector is mixed. For example, Strassmann (1987) found that 71 percent of home
workers in Lima would require a considerable financial incentive to move to the formal
sector (see also Thomas, 1992). Pradhan and Van Soest (1995), using data for urban
Bolivia, compare reduced form models for sector choice in which sectors are ordered with
models in which sectors are not ordered, and find that the ordered model performs better
for men but not for women. Using the same data in a more structural model, Pradhan
and van Soest (1997) find that wage differentials between formal and informal sector
tend to be negative rather than positive, and that non-monetary job characteristics
(such as job stability, social security, health care access, etc.) are needed to explain
why most people prefer formal sector jobs. Studies looking at wage differentials for
various countries –with mixed results– are reported by Pradhan and van Soest (1995),
for example. These existing studies are based on cross-section data.
Our study explores the role of the informal sector from a dynamic perspective, using
quarterly panel data for five large cities in Mexico. This seems particularly useful since
the staging hypothesis model of Fields (1975) uses a dynamic setting, and has impli-
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cations for the mobility between sectors. We study the mobility patterns among three
different labor market states which are formal sector employment, informal sector work,
and not working; and analyze how these patterns vary across groups with different char-
acteristics and family resources, and between periods of economic growth or recession.
We also discuss the extent to which our findings support either the Fields (1975) model
or the weakly competitive equilibrium view.
Obviously, both views are stylized, and the actual labor market will share features
of both. Still, many of our findings are in line with the staging hypothesis of Fields
(1975). Entry rates into the formal sector are lower than into the informal sector for the
low educated nonworkers, showing that entry into the formal sector is more difficult for
them. The probability of formal sector employment strongly increases with education
level. For men, it is easier to enter the formal sector from the non-working state than
from the informal sector. Such a result cannot be found for women, since most women
who do not work, are not looking for work either, implying that the transition rates from
non-working to formal and informal sector work are low. The probability of working in
the informal sector decreases with the level of income of other family members, while
other family income increases the probability of not working. This confirms the view
that only those who can afford it do not work.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some back-
ground information regarding the Mexican urban labor market and describes the data,
which are drawn from the Mexico Urban Employment Survey. Two separate panel data
sets are available to us, each of which consists of five quarterly waves. The first runs
from the first quarter of 1992 until the first quarter of 1993, a period of steady economic
growth. The second runs from the last quarter of 1994 till the last quarter of 1995 – a
period of recession following the so-called Peso crisis. We present descriptive statistics
on the size of the three sectors in each wave, and on transition rates. We also present
some illustrating figures on wage levels in formal and informal sectors, although wages
will not be incorporated explicitly in our econometric model.
The econometric model is discussed in Section 3. We use a reduced form dynamic
multinomial logit model for panel data with random effects, explaining the labor market
state of each individual in each time period. The model is a variation of the first-order
Markov models proposed in Heckman (1981a), where ‘true’ structural state dependence
and heterogeneity are distinguished by including dummies for the one period lagged
labor market state, as well as unobserved individual random effects. We compare the
results of a model in which the lagged dependent variables are interacted with exogenous
variables with those of a parsimonious model without interactions. The initial condition
problem associated with this kind of model is treated following the procedure proposed
by Heckman (1981b).
The estimation results are discussed in Section 4. Moreover, to interpret the meaning
of the parameter estimates, we use the model to simulate transition probabilities for
groups with various background characteristics. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
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2 Background information on the labor market and
Data
2.1 Mexico’s Labor Market
After going through a serious and painful economic adjustment in the wake of the “debt
crisis” in the 1980’s, Mexico enjoyed a period of economic growth. From 1989 to 1994,
average GDP growth was about 3.9 percent per year.1 Growth ended abruptly in 1995,
when GDP fell by 6.2 percent in the aftermath of the so-called “Peso Crisis”. The
economy recovered rapidly in 1996 with GDP increasing by 5.9 percent.
A typical feature of the Mexican labor market is its low open unemployment rates,
despite a continuously growing labor force. Since the 1980’s, the official urban unem-
ployment rate kept falling, to 2.6 percent in 1991, and it remained below 4 percent until
1994 (see Fleck and Sorrentino, 1994). It increased in 1995 due to the crisis, but even
at the worst point in 1995, it was still below 7 percent. In 1997 and 1998, it fell back
below 4 percent and 3 percent, respectively (see OECD, Main Economic Indicators,
May 1999). At the same time, Mexico’s labor force grew rapidly, with an annual rate of
about 2.9 percent in the 1990’s. An explanation for the low unemployment rate could
be that official open unemployment does not include all those who would be counted as
unemployed by Western concepts, such as underemployed workers. As shown by Fleck
and Sorrentino (1994), however, the unemployment rate is still relatively low according
to Western standards after this is adjusted for.
Another explanation for this is the presence of an informal labor market, where a
large number of individuals have some marginal job. Two arguments for this second
explanation can be given. On the one hand, Mexico’s formal sector is characterized by
extensive labor market regulations. Mexican Federal Labor Law (FLL) governs virtu-
ally every aspect of labor relations, such as minimum wages, limits on working hours,
overtime pay, profit sharing, etc. It was especially designed to protect the individual
employees’ employment security (see Hollon, 1996, and Zelek and de la Vega, 1992),
and includes rules for termination of employment, including obligations of severance
payments. In addition, the government places health and safety requirements on firms.
Hiring would be prohibitively costly for many small firms, particularly those who are
not officially registered, if they were to fulfil all the requirements. On the other hand,
Mexico has no unemployment compensation, so that individuals without (formal) work
are often forced into “marginal activities”, such as street vending, etc. Those who are
actually unemployed and do not undertake such activities are then those who can afford
to search (See Fleck and Sorrentino, 1994). This is in line with the staging hypothesis
which views the informal sector as consisting of secondary jobs.
Mexico has the lowest labor costs per worker of all OECD countries. Its average
labor costs are less than 25% of those in Germany and less than 30% of those in the US
1The figures are based on World Development Indicators, 1997.
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(OECD, 1998). The main reasons are low gross wages and the absence of income taxes.
Social security contributions are lower than OECD average but higher than in countries
such as Japan, the UK or Spain.
2.2 Data
The data used in the analysis were drawn from Mexico’s Urban Employment Survey
(Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano), conducted by Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,
Geografia e Informatica (INEGI, i.e. Mexican Statistical Institute). This is a rotating
panel drawn in 32 Mexican cities, and it is the only quarterly household panel survey
in Mexico. For our analysis, we use the data for five Mexican cities: Mexico City,
Guadalajara, Monterrey, Tijuana, and Ciudad-Juarez. These five cities cover 60 percent
of urban employment in Mexico. In the border towns Tijuana and Ciudad-Juarez the in-
bond industries concentrate. Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey represent about
a quarter of the entire population of Mexico, and half of the population of cities with
more than 100,000 inhabitants. Moreover, Guadalajara is the city with the largest share
of informal workers (See Villagomez, 1998).
Our first panel covers a period of economic growth: the first quarter of 1992 until
the first quarter of 1993. The second panel, from the last quarter of 1994 until the last
quarter of 1995, covers the recession after the Peso crisis. The survey provides detailed
information on the economic activities of all the household members older than twelve
years of age, such as employment status, employment conditions, working hours, labor
income, characteristics of the workplace, etc., but no information on nonlabor income.
Data from the survey have been used to calculate the official open unemployment rates
of Mexico. They have also been used by, for example, Fleck & Sorrentino (1994) for
the analysis of unemployment in urban Mexico, and by Villagomez (1996,1998) and
Calderón-Madrid (1999) for studies of labor market segmentation and labor market
mobility.
The 1992 panel consists about 2500 households in each wave, and the 1995 panel has
about 2700 households per wave. From the two panels, four separate unbalanced panels
of men and women were created. Only those individuals who are present in at least two
consecutive quarters were selected. We only selected men and women who are either the
head of the household or the spouse of the head of the household, who are younger than
65 years of age, and who are not full time students. In this way we retained 1691 males
and 1907 females for the 1992 panel, and 1673 males and 1923 females for the 1995
panel. However, 269 males and 627 females in the 1992 panel, and 298 males and 636
females in the 1995 panel were excluded because information on other family members’
income was missing. Moreover, 18 males and 82 females in the 1992 panel, and 11 males
and 79 females in the 1995 panel were left out because they are unpaid family workers
(see below). This gave the final samples we work with. For the 1992 panel, we have
1404 men and 1198 women. For the 1995 panel, we have 1364 men and 1208 women.
In the 1992 panel, about 64% of the observations is present in all the five waves, and
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about 12% in only two waves; while in the 1995 panel, about 75% of the observations
is present in all the five waves, and 7.7% in only two waves. The explanation of the
variables used in the analysis and sample statistics are presented in Table A1 and Table
A2 of the appendix.
Until now, we have not precisely defined the distinction between formal and informal
sector jobs. According to the 1972 ILO Employment mission to Kenya, informality is
defined as a “way of doing things characterized by: (1) ease of entry, (2) reliance on
indigenous resources, (3) family ownership of resources, (4) small scale of operation,
(5) labor intensive and adapted technology, (6) skill acquired outside of the formal
school system, and (7) unregulated and competitive markets” (c.f. ILO, 1972). This
definition, however, has to be made more precise to be used empirically. Some authors
have emphasized the small scale of informal activities, and use a definition based upon
size. Others have used survey information on the nature of the employment relation
(Magnac, 1991, Pradhan and van Soest, 1995, 1997). A third definition which seems less
common in the international literature, is based upon whether social security premiums
are paid (see Calderón-Madrid, 1999, and Martin, 1999). We compare the classifications
according to these three definitions. In the economic models, we will use a definition
based upon size as the benchmark, but also present some results using a definition based
upon occupational status.
For the benchmark (‘size’) definition, an individual is defined as working in the
informal sector if he or she is an employer or employee in a setup with fewer than
six workers, and is neither a professional nor an unpaid family worker. Professionals
(lawyers, doctors, etc.; about 5% of men and 0.5% of women) are categorized as formal
sector workers, together with all those in enterprises of more than five workers. Unpaid
family workers could neither be categorized as workers nor as non-workers, and are
therefore deleted from the sample.
The alternative (‘job type’) definition is mainly based on a survey question which dis-
tinguishes various sorts of jobs. Those who “work for their own account,” piece-workers,
and those who report to be the head of a firm with zero employees, are categorized as
informal. Those who work for a fixed wage, cooperative workers, employers (with at
least one employee) and independent professionals, are categorized as formal. Unpaid
family workers are again deleted from the sample.
The two definitions do not lead to the same classification. For the first panel, for
example, 57.4% of working men are in the formal sector according to both definitions,
12.2% are formal according to the job type definition, but informal according to the
size definition, 5.0% are formal according to the size definition and informal according
to the job type definition, and 25.4% are informal according to both definitions. In
particular, many workers are salaried employees in firms with less than six employees,
and are classified as informal according to the size definition only. For the first panel of
men, for example, salaried workers are about 63.3% of all workers, and about 13.8% of
the salaried workers are classified as informal workers according to the ‘size’ definition,
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but all of them would be classified as formal workers according to ‘job type’ definition.
Moreover, piece workers who would be classified as informal workers according to the
‘job type’ definition are about 8.2% of all the workers, but about 60.3% of them are
classified as formal workers according to the ‘size’ definition. For the other panel and
for women, a similar degree of overlap between the two definitions is found.
To understand the classifications more precisely, we cross-tabulated in Table 1 the
results according to both definitions given above with the coverage of social security
services. Compulsory social security includes ‘ISSSTE’ and ‘IMSS’, which are the social
security institutions in Mexico. By law, an employee in an officially registered firm
should be covered by either of the two. They cover a range of services for those who
pay into either of the two systems (medical, sport facilities, funeral services, child-care
services for working women, etc.). ISSSTE covers public sector employees, and IMSS
covers the private sector. Until recently, these two systems also involved pensions, but
this has recently been reformed. Other social security services than ‘ISSSTE’ or ‘IMSS’
include, for example, private and voluntary insurances. Most of the 54.7% workers
covered by the social security services are classified as formal workers by both of the
two definitions, and this is similar for the two definitions. However, about 26.4% and
40.2% of the workers who are not covered by the social security services are classified
as formal workers according to firm size and job-type definition, respectively. Thus
social security coverage corresponds better to the firm size classification than to the job
type classification. This also makes us lean towards the firm-size definition. The reason
that we do not use the coverage of social security services as the criterion is that it
seems too restrictive and does not correspond to definitions used in the international
literature. The formal sector implies more than having access to social security services,
for example, severance payments, etc.. Some workers may only enjoy some part of their
rights regulated by the labor institutions.
Table 1. Social security and classification into
formal and informal jobs (%)
Social security Firm-size Job-type
formal informal total formal informal total
none 11.98 33.35 45.33 18.24 27.09 45.33
compulsory 45.03 3.36 48.39 45.62 2.77 48.39
other 5.43 0.85 6.28 5.79 0.49 6.28
total 62.44 37.56 100 69.65 30.35 100
Because of the problems with measuring open unemployment and the small numbers
of people classifying themselves as unemployed, we do not distinguish unemployment as
a separate labor market state. We thus merge the unemployed with other non-workers.
Table 2 shows how the percentages of formal sector workers, the informal sector workers,
and nonworkers evolve over time. It is based upon the size definition. For men in our
sample, the formal sector and informal sector workers represent about 60% and 35%
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of the labor force, respectively. During 1995, the formal sector share falls from 61% to
55%, illustrating the recession. On the other hand, the informal sector increases from
33% to 36%. The number of men without work is small, but larger in 1995 than in
1992. The employment rate of women in the sample has increased from 1992 to 1995,
but remains quite low. During 1992, about 18% of women worked in the formal sector.
This increased to about 21% in 1995. The percentage in the informal sector is smaller.
Still, the number of informal sector workers as a percentage of all workers, is larger for
women than for men.
The analogue of Table 2 using the job type definition of the informal sector is pre-
sented in Table A4 in the appendix. It has smaller numbers of informal sector workers,
in line with the comparison for the first quarter discussed above. The pattern over time
and the relative differences between men and women, however, are similar to those in
Table 2.
Table 2. Sample percentages in three labor market states
Quarter 92.1 92.2 92.3 92.4 93.1 94.4 95.1 95.2 95.3 95.4
Males
Formal 57.9 56.4 58.8 58.6 57.7 60.9 59.9 56.4 55.0 55.2
Informal 35.8 35.4 34.6 34.1 34.2 33.1 32.4 34.8 35.3 36.4
Nonempl. 6.4 8.2 6.6 7.3 8.1 5.9 7.7 8.8 9.8 8.4
Females
Formal 17.6 17.6 17.8 18.4 17.8 21.9 20.6 20.8 21.1 19.6
Informal 13.6 12.5 12.1 12.5 12.6 13.8 13.9 12.7 12.1 12.8
Nonempl. 68.8 70.0 70.1 69.0 69.6 64.4 65.5 66.6 66.7 67.6
As a first illustration of the difference between formal and informal sector, Figures
1 and 2 compare real wages in the two sectors (using the size definition).2 We do this
separately for those of the middle and higher and those of the lower education levels (see
Table A1). For men and women who received middle and higher education, the averages
of the formal sector log wages are always clearly larger than those in the informal sector.
The sample standard deviations of the log wages are similar. The higher average wage
in the formal sector seems to support the staging hypothesis. For the individuals with
lower education level, however, a very different picture emerges. The differences in the
means are small, and the standard deviation in the formal sector is smaller than in the
informal sector.3
In Table 3, the sample probabilities of individuals’ transitions among the three labor
market states are presented. These are based upon the firm size classification. For both
males and females, the nonworkers have a larger probability to find an informal job
2The nominal wages are computed from reported monthly income divided by actual working hours,
and the real wages are obtained from the nominal wages using IMF CPI as the deflator (Source: Data
Stream).
3Quantitatively similar results are obtained if monthly earnings are used instead of hourly rates.
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than to find a formal job, and for males, this difference increases during the recession.
Moreover, the proportion of male nonworkers who remain inactive in the next quarter
is higher in the economic boom than in the recession. As shown in the table, the
probabilities of remaining in the formal sector are larger than those of remaining in the
informal sector, suggesting that the exit rates for the formal sector are lower than for
the informal sector. This does not necessarily mean, however, that jobs in the formal
sector are more stable than jobs in the informal sector. It could be the case that job
separations for formal and informal sector jobs are equally likely. The difference in sector
exit rates could then be due to the fact that the probability that someone who leaves a
job in the formal sector finds another formal sector job, is larger than the probability
that someone who leaves an informal sector job, goes to another informal sector job.
The mere difference in size between the sectors might be a plausible explanation for
this, particularly for men. Since the data do not provide information on whether people
change jobs or not, we are unable to compare job mobility in the two sectors.
The sample probabilities of transitions according to the job type definition are pre-
sented in the Tables A5. The transition rates into the formal sector are larger than
those according to the “firm-size” definition, but the general patterns of the transitions
probabilities are not very different. The size of mobility among the three states is quite
large according to both definitions. For example, around 12% of formal sector and more
than 20% of informal sector male workers in 1992 leave their sector in the next quarter
according to the firm size definition. According to the job type definition, these two
figures are about 14% and 29%, respectively.
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Table 3. Sample probabilities of transitions
t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
t− 1 Form. Infor. Noem. Form. Infor. Noem. Form. Infor. Noem. Form. Infor. Noem.
Men 92
Form. 0.874 0.088 0.038 0.884 0.098 0.018 0.880 0.093 0.027 0.871 0.099 0.030
Infor. 0.142 0.796 0.061 0.175 0.765 0.059 0.158 0.772 0.070 0.134 0.797 0.068
Noem. 0.100 0.271 0.629 0.200 0.250 0.550 0.227 0.213 0.560 0.183 0.183 0.634
Men 95
Form. 0.873 0.095 0.033 0.841 0.106 0.053 0.864 0.083 0.053 0.877 0.084 0.038
Infor. 0.167 0.758 0.076 0.133 0.787 0.080 0.128 0.802 0.070 0.139 0.801 0.060
Noem. 0.203 0.261 0.536 0.155 0.393 0.452 0.186 0.320 0.495 0.189 0.369 0.441
Women 92
Form. 0.769 0.036 0.195 0.810 0.033 0.158 0.823 0.059 0.118 0.826 0.047 0.128
Infor. 0.062 0.608 0.331 0.083 0.598 0.318 0.062 0.628 0.310 0.040 0.640 0.320
Noem. 0.033 0.052 0.915 0.033 0.056 0.911 0.041 0.052 0.908 0.035 0.050 0.915
Women 95
Form. 0.817 0.052 0.131 0.863 0.048 0.088 0.853 0.022 0.124 0.813 0.064 0.123
Infor. 0.056 0.681 0.264 0.058 0.639 0.303 0.064 0.636 0.300 0.063 0.659 0.278
Noem. 0.019 0.052 0.929 0.032 0.047 0.922 0.040 0.051 0.909 0.027 0.053 0.920
Explanation: number of transitions from labour market state in t− 1 (row) to labour market state in t
(column), as a percentage of number of people in labour market in t− 1 (row). For example,
14.2% of all men who work in the informal sector at time of the first wave of the 92 panel work
in the formal sector three months later.
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3 Model and Estimation Method
To explain the labor market state of each individual in each quarter, we use a dy-
namic multinomial logit panel data model with random effects. This model is similar to
the first-order Markov model proposed in Heckman (1981a). The model distinguishes
between ‘true’ structural state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity by including
lagged state dummies as explanatory variables and individual effects to control for the
unobserved characteristics. The individual effects are assumed to be independent of
the observed characteristics (and therefore called random effects) and to follow a mul-
tivariate normal distribution. The model is reduced form in that it does not take into
account the wage effect directly. Instead, the impact of wages is accounted for indirectly
by including education and age variables. The initial condition problem associated with
applying this model to a short panel, is treated as in Heckman (1981b).
More precisely, assume individual i (= 1, . . . , n) can be in any of J possible labor
market states at time t. Throughout the paper, we will use J=3: working in the formal
sector (j = 1), working in the informal sector (j = 2), and not working (j = 3). The
“utility” of state j (j = 1, . . . , J) in time period t > 1 is specified as
V (i, j, t) = X ′itβj + Z
′
itγj + αij + εijt, (1)
where Xit is a vector of explanatory variables which includes age, educational dummies,
family composition, time dummies, etc.. Zit is a vector of dummy variables indicating
the lagged labor market state, and of interactions of these dummies with Xit . Here
we use two dummies for informal sector and not working, the formal sector is taken
as the reference state. The vectors βj and γj are parameters to be estimated. αij is a
random effect reflecting time constant unobserved heterogeneity. To identify the model,
β1, γ1, and αi1 are normalized to 0. The εijt are i.i.d. error terms. They are assumed to
be independent of the Xit and αij, and are assumed to follow a Type I extreme value
distribution. Hence, the probability for individual i to be in state j at time t > 1, given
characteristics Xit, random effects αij’s and the lagged state dummies, can be written
as
P (j | Xit, Zit, αi1, . . . , αiJ) =









Let αi ≡ (αi2, . . . , αiJ)′. The αi are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distri-
bution.4 In other words, the αij are specified as linear combinations of J−1 independent
N(0, 1) variables:
αi = Aηi, with ηi ∼ NJ−1(0, IJ−1) (3)
where A is a J − 1 × J − 1 lower triangular parameter matrix to be estimated. The
covariance matrix of αi is then given by Σα = AA
′.
4We also experimented with discrete distributions with a finite number of mass points, but this did
not lead to larger likelihood values and gave convergence problems for more than two or three mass
points.
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Due to the presence of the lagged dependent variables in Zit, an initial conditions
problem arises. This can be dealt with in the same way as in Heckman (1981b): for
time t = 1, a static multinomial logit model is used, with different slope parameters
and not including Zit. This model can be seen as a linear approximation to the reduced
form that would be obtained if the lagged dependent variables were replaced by their
specifications according to the dynamic model for periods earlier than t = 1. Although
this approximation is not exact due to the nonlinear nature of the model, Heckman
(1981b) reports Monte Carlo results showing that this procedure performs quite well
for a dynamic panel data binary choice model, and the approximation leads to a small
asymptotic bias only. The specification of V (i, j, 1) is as follows:
V (i, j, 1) = X ′i1πj + θij + εij1, (4)
where πj is a vector of parameters and θij is the random effect; As before, the errors εij1
are assumed to be independent of all Xit and αij(and θij), and of all εijt in other time
periods t, and are assumed to be i.i.d. with a Type I extreme value distribution. The
probability for individual i to be in state j (j = 1, . . . , J) at time t = 1, given Xi1 and
the random effects θi= θi2, . . . , θiJ , can thus be written as
P1(j | Xi1, θi) =





Again, π1 and θi1 are normalized to 0. The reduced form interpretation of (4) implies
that the random effects θij are induced by unobserved heterogeneity in (1), so that they
will be functions of αi. We therefore assume that θi = (θi2, . . . , θiJ)
′ is given by
θi = Cαi = Bηi (6)
where B is a J − 1 × J − 1 lower triangular parameter matrix to be estimated. The
covariance matrix of θi (Σθ) is thus given by BB
′.
The model can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood. If the random effects ηi (or αi
and θi) were observed, the likelihood contribution of individual i with observed states
j1, . . . , jT would be given by
Li(ηi) = P1(j1 | Xi1, θi)P (j2 | Xi2, Zi2,αi) · · ·P (jT | XiT , ZiT ,αi) (7)
This is straightforward to compute, since it is a sequence of multinomial logit prob-
abilities. Since the individual effects are not observed, however, the likelihood contribu-








Li(ηi)ϕ(ηi)dηi2 · · ·dηiJ , (8)
whereϕ(ηi) is the joint density function ofηi. Computation of the likelihood contribu-
tion in (8) involves J − 1 dimensional integration. In our case, J = 3, and various
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numerical techniques exist to approximate the integral. We will use a (Smooth) Simu-
lated Maximum Likelihood approach, which also works for larger values of J . It is based
upon the fact that (8) is the expected value of (7); the expected value is approximated
by a simulated mean. For each individual, R values of ηi are drawn from NJ−1(0, IJ−1),
and the average of the R likelihood values conditional on the drawn values of ηi are








The resulting estimator is consistent if R tends to infinity with the number of obser-
vations (n). If n1/2/R→ 0 and with independent draws across observations, the method
is asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood, see Lee (1992) or Gourieroux and
Monfort (1993), for example. In our empirical setting, we used R = 30. To check the
sensitivity of the results for the choice of R, we also estimated the model for R = 20,
and found little change in the results when we increased R from 20 to 30.
4 Results
Estimates
We estimated two models. The first is a parsimonious model in which the interactions
between the lagged dependent variable and demographic variables, such as, age, edu-
cation, and city dummies, are excluded. The other is the general model without this
restriction and with all interactions. The models were estimated separately for the two
panels, for both men and women. Likelihood ratio tests show that, at the 1% signifi-
cance level, the null hypothesis of no interaction terms is rejected only for males of the
1992 panel.5 Hence, our further analysis will focus on the restricted model. We present
some results of the unrestricted model for men of the 1992 panel in the appendix (Tables
A9) for comparison.
Presented in Table 4 are the estimates of the dynamic equations in (1), for the
restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. The estimates of the static reduced
form equation (4) are reported in Table A3 of the appendix. A positive sign of the
parameter βj or γj (j = 2, 3) means that the corresponding variable has a positive
impact on the probability to be in state j compared to the probability to be in the
formal sector (the reference state). Most parameter estimates are similar for the two
time periods. According to the restricted model, age plays a significant role in that
the young and the elderly are more likely to be not employed. Compared to the ones
5The χ2 statistics for men of 1992 panel, women of 1992 panel, men of 1995 panel, and women of
1995 panel, are 91.0, 42.6, 44.8, and 34.1, respectively. The 1% critical value for a χ2 distribution with
28 degrees of freedom is 48.3.
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who received lower education (both men and women), higher educated persons were less
likely to be in the informal sector or to be not employed. For women, having younger
children reduces the probability to work, both in the formal and the informal sector. The
number of children does not affect the men’s behavior. The impact of these demographic
variables is also in line with the common findings in the literature. The regional dummies
are mostly insignificant for the 1992 panel, but for the 1995 panel, when the general
market conditions were worse in most of the country, the picture changed. In the city
of Guadalajara, where the informal sector was the largest, men were more likely to be
in the informal sector or not employed than in Mexico City. Women in the border cities
of Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana are less likely to be in the informal sector or to be not
employed than those in Mexico City. An explanation may be that in the former two
cities, many Maquiladoras6 (in-bond industries) whose main labor force are unskilled
women are located (See Kopinak, 1995). These workers are classified as formal sector
workers. The products of these industries are mainly exported to the U. S.. The 30%
devaluated peso after the ‘Peso Crisis’ made Mexican labor cheaper and stimulated the
activity and demand for labor in the in-bond industries.
For the 1992 panel, the coefficients of the variable ‘Othinc’ (income of other family
members) corresponding to the state ‘Informal’ are significantly negative, which means
that higher income of other family members decreased the probability of working in the
informal sector. However, for the 1995 panel, although the signs are still negative, this is
not significant anymore. This is the case for both men and women. In addition, for the
1995 panel, higher income from other family members increased the men’s probability
of being not employed. In the boom of 1992, individuals with more sources of income
could afford to search and could find desired (formal) jobs, but during the recession,
when the number of (formal) jobs shrank, they could not find formal jobs as easily as
before, and their probability of being not employed increased.
The positive signs of coefficients of the lagged dependent variables indicate that an
individual who works in the informal sector is more likely to be not employed in the next
quarter than a similar individual who held a formal sector job, and that a nonworker
has a larger probability to enter the informal sector than a formal sector worker. The
variances and the covariances of the random effects are in the last part of Table 4. The
results show that the random effects always play a significant role and contribute more to
the state choice than the idiosyncratic errors (which, by normalization, all have variance
π2/6). Moreover, the two individual heterogeneity terms are positively correlated.
Our findings with the unrestricted model are not very different. Taking into account
the interaction effects, the overall profile does not change much, but the parameters
(particularly the interaction terms) are estimated with less precision. In Table A6,
we present the estimates of the unrestricted model for men of the 1992 panel. Only
the interactions of lagged dependent variables with city dummies are included, because
other interaction terms (including, perhaps surprisingly, interactions with education
6See Martin, (1999), for some institutional background information
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level dummies) do not play a significant role. In 1992, compared to those in Mexico
City, men in Tijuana, Ciudad-Juarez, or Guadalajara are less likely to have a formal
sector job, but the informal sector workers in these cities are significantly more likely
to find a formal sector job in the next quarter than in Mexico City, and the inactive
individuals in the two border towns are also more likely to find a formal sector job in
the next quarter. The dynamic effects in this model are not so easy to interpret. We
will look at simulated transition probabilities in the next section.
Table 4. Estimates of the restricted model –dynamic equation
1992 Panel 1995 Panel
Men Women Men Women
Param. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem.
βj :
Const. -0.513 -1.677 -4.816* -2.164** -1.845 0.095 -1.476 2.381**
Age -0.033 -0.142* 0.140** -0.129** -0.007 -0.201* -0.027 -0.174*
Age2 0.001 0.003* -0.001 0.002* 0.000 0.003* 0.001 0.003*
Child 0.163 -0.173 0.157 0.545* -0.094 -0.129 0.159 0.390*
Adults -0.089 -0.008 0.093 0.087 0.172* 0.144* 0.140 0.022
Medu -0.960* -0.304 -1.199* -0.967* -1.427* -1.071* -1.634* -1.152*
Hedu -3.058* -1.459* -1.904* -2.279* -2.387* -1.584* -2.092* -2.375*
Othinc -0.040** 0.038 -0.073** 0.022 -0.011 0.050** -0.053 0.059
JuaTij 0.016 0.176 -0.453** 0.134 -0.185 -0.368** -0.586** -0.534*
Guada 0.065 0.219 0.011 -0.089 0.763* 0.849* 0.119 0.126
Mont. -0.193 -0.015 0.001 0.042 -0.466* -0.360 0.420 0.195
Nmar -0.149 1.395* 0.050 -1.958* 0.132 1.319* -0.307 -1.949*
T3 -0.141 -0.401** -0.140 -0.201 0.397* 0.452* -0.379 -0.273
T4 -0.213 -0.225 -0.104 -0.270 0.409* 0.528* -0.498** -0.324
T5 -0.085 -0.072 -0.094 -0.154 0.414* 0.289 -0.136 -0.062
γj :
Infor.−1 1.238* 1.294* 3.901* 2.489* 1.437* 0.776* 2.322* 2.027*
Noem.−1 1.161* 2.584* 2.856* 2.927* 1.738 2.081* 1.937* 3.492*
Σα :
σ22 9.686* 1.412* 9.121* 6.400*
σ23 2.920* 3.489* 3.121* 3.762*
σ23 3.954* 0.610 4.517* 3.293*
Notes:
* Significant at 5% level; ** significant at 10 % level.
Reference state: formal sector work
σ2j : variance of αij, j = 2, 3; σ23: covariance of αi2 and αi3
“Lowedu”, “T2”, “Mex. City”, and “Form.−1”, are the omitted control group dummies
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Simulations
The simulations are conducted for the first two quarters, with individual characteristics
fixed and the unobserved heterogeneity terms (random effects) drawn from their esti-
mated distributions. The “unconditional” probabilities (for given characteristics, but
not for given lagged labor market state) are the averages over the draws of the random
effects, the conditional probabilities – given characteristics as well as the lagged labor
market state – are computed as the ratio of two unconditional probabilities.7 Specifi-
cally, for each of the two panels, and for men and women, the average probabilities (over
the random effects) of all the labor market states in the first and the second quarter
are calculated for two persons, who only differ in education level. Moreover, the same
characteristics are imposed for the individuals in both panels. For example, Table 5
refers to two individuals, who are both married with one young child, received higher
education, are 40 years old in the first quarter of each panel, etc.. Standard errors of
the probabilities are estimated by repeating the simulations for a large number of draws
(1000 draws in our case) from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the parameter
estimates. The results are summarized in Tables 5-8.
Several things are worth to be pointed out. First, higher educated individuals (both
men and women) not only have a larger chance to be employed, but also are much
more likely to be formal sector workers than lower educated persons. For example, the
probabilities for the highly educated male to be a formal sector worker are 0.77 or more,
versus 0.57 or less for the lower educated male. This can be seen as evidence that highly
educated men are more likely to find formal sector jobs.
Second, for men of both education levels, the probability to enter the formal sector
is larger for the non-employed than for informal sector workers. This is in line with the
notion that it is easier to search for a formal sector job from non-employment than from
informal sector employment, which is one of the assumptions underlying the staging
hypothesis. On the other hand, it could also mean that some informal sector workers
are not looking for a formal sector job.
Third, a salient difference between the transition patterns for men in the two panels,
is that the transition rates from formal and informal sector into non-employment are
larger for the second than for the first panel. This is the case for men with low as well
as high education. This result could reflect higher lay-off rates during the recession,
combined with the fact that some of those who are laid off do not immediately find
different employment in either sector.
Fourth, the transition rates from non-employment into the formal sector are larger
than those into the informal sector for the higher educated men, but given the large
estimated standard errors, they are not significantly different for either panel. However,
for lower educated men the transition rates from non-employment into the formal sector
are smaller than those into the informal sector, and in the second panel, this difference
7This implies that the conditional probability is the weighted average of the conditional probabilities
for given value of αi, where the weights are posterior weights given the lagged labor market state.
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is even significant despite the imprecise estimates. Given the relative sizes of the two
sectors in both markets for the higher educated (0.779:0.196 in the first panel) and
lower educated men (0.573:0.402 in the first panel), the estimates suggest that it is
more likely to find jobs in the informal sector than in the formal sector for both higher
educated and lower educated non-workers. This is concordant with the assumption that
the entry of the formal sector is more restricted. Moreover, the transition rate from
non-employment into the informal sector increases during the second panel, though this
result is not significant. While the estimated transition rate from non-employment into
the formal sector hardly changes for men with high education levels, it falls substantially
for the low educated. The reason could be that during the recession, excess labor supply
allows firms to hire mainly skilled workers. Again, however, this result is insignificant,
due to the small numbers of non-employed men.
For highly educated females, the estimates show the same pattern as for highly
educated males, although the standard errors are much larger, due to the small number
of observations in this category. Few women with high education level work in the
informal sector. The probability to stop working for informal sector workers is quite
high. There are no larger differences between the two time periods. For low educated
women, the probabilities of formal and informal sector work are almost the same. Given
this and the fact that the probabilities of remaining in the formal sector (for example,
0.766 in the first panel) are larger than those of remaining in the informal sector (for
example, 0.541 in the first panel), we conclude that formal sector work is more stable
than informal sector work. For the higher educated females, the transition rates into
the formal sector from non-employment are the same as the corresponding rates into
the informal sector,8 but for the lower educated females, they are significantly smaller
than those into the informal sector. Surprisingly, the probabilities to stay in the same
sector are larger during the recession than during the upswing of the business cycle. In
particular, transition rates into non-employment are lower during the recession. This
might reflect the fact that fewer people could afford to be without work.
In the appendix (Table A7 and A8), we also present some results for the model with
interactions (men, first panel). These simulation results are very imprecise due to both
a larger number of parameters involved and the small number of observations in some
categories because of the inclusion of interaction terms. Still, the picture is more or
less unchanged compared to the model without interactions, and the conclusions remain
valid.
8Parallel to the analysis for men, one might draw the conclusion that it is easier to find jobs in
the formal sector for higher educated females given the relative size of the two sectors. But females
nonworkers consist mostly of nonparticipants, hence the self-selection effect is prominent here.
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Table 5. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, higher education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(J2 | j1)
jt t = 1 t = 2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.779 0.782 0.926 0.062 0.012
(0.035) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) (0.005)
Informal 0.196 0.201 0.202 0.765 0.033
(0.031) (0.024) (0.046) (0.050) (0.015)
Not-employed 0.025 0.018 0.378 0.272 0.351
(0.020) (0.011) (0.090) (0.109) (0.139)
94.4
Formal 0.797 0.772 0.926 0.059 0.026
(0.029) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.008)
Informal 0.184 0.195 0.188 0.771 0.042
(0.030) (0.020) (0.042) (0.047) (0.012)
Not-employed 0.018 0.033 0.392 0.336 0.272
(0.013) (0.010) (0.085) (0.068) (0.065)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, lower education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(j2 | j1)
jt t = 1 t = 2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.573 0.537 0.841 0.135 0.024
(0.040) (0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.009)
Informal 0.402 0.429 0.119 0.849 0.032
(0.037) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.016)
Not-employed 0.025 0.035 0.276 0.380 0.344
(0.033) (0.024) (0.078) (0.124) (0.158)
94.4
Formal 0.537 0.491 0.807 0.123 0.070
(0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.020) (0.017)
Informal 0.433 0.434 0.117 0.822 0.061
(0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.013)
Not-employed 0.030 0.075 0.228 0.408 0.364
(0.017) (0.016) (0.085) (0.068) (0.086)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Females, higher education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(j2 | j1)
jt t = 1 t = 2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.517 0.453 0.808 0.026 0.167
(0.082) (0.062) (0.064) (0.018) (0.056)
Informal 0.075 0.078 0.110 0.581 0.310
(0.057) (0.033) (0.062) (0.120) (0.098)
Not-employed 0.409 0.468 0.067 0.053 0.879
(0.075) (0.060) (0.035) (0.029) (0.047)
94.4
Formal 0.487 0.448 0.851 0.028 0.121
(0.071) (0.068) (0.066) (0.013) (0.059)
Informal 0.064 0.076 0.102 0.616 0.282
(0.035) (0.028) (0.046) (0.090) (0.091)
Not-employed 0.449 0.476 0.059 0.051 0.889
(0.069) (0.070) (0.035) (0.020) (0.043)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Females, lower education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(j2 | j1)
jt t = 1 t = 2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.133 0.117 0.766 0.060 0.174
(0.035) (0.020) (0.086) (0.027) (0.070)
Informal 0.156 0.137 0.027 0.541 0.433
(0.041) (0.029) (0.024) (0.065) (0.064)
Not-employed 0.711 0.745 0.016 0.063 0.921
(0.048) (0.031) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021)
94.4
Formal 0.145 0.139 0.843 0.055 0.102
(0.027) (0.026) (0.074) (0.025) (0.052)
Informal 0.150 0.139 0.036 0.600 0.364
(0.036) (0.026) (0.022) (0.056) (0.058)
Not-employed 0.704 0.722 0.016 0.059 0.926
(0.045) (0.041) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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5 Conclusions
We have investigated the function of the informal sector in urban Mexico by studying
the transition patterns among the three labor market states formal sector employment,
informal sector employment, and non-employment. Mobility among these three states is
extremely large compared to other OECD countries. A random effects dynamic multi-
nomial logit model was estimated using simulated maximum likelihood methods for two
Mexican panel data sets covering non-overlapping time periods. Our findings are in line
with the literature. The probability of formal sector employment strongly increases with
education level. The probability of working in the informal sector decreases with the
level of income of other family members, while the probability of not working increases
with this.
The simulated probabilities of transitions for individuals in different market condi-
tions and for different individuals in the same period were compared. We found that
for lower educated nonworkers, the transition rates into the formal sector are lower than
the transition rates into the informal sector. This may be an indication that the barrier
of the formal sector is higher than the barrier of the informal sector. We also found, for
all but lower educated men, that the probabilities of remaining in the formal sector are
larger than the probabilities of remaining in the informal sector, and that the transition
probabilities from the informal sector to the formal sector are larger than those from
the formal to the informal sector. For lower educated women, this suggests that formal
sector jobs are more stable than the informal sector, since the sizes of the two sectors are
similar for this group. For the other groups, the difference might be due to the mere fact
that the formal sector is larger than the informal sector, so that people who separate
from their job have a higher probability of finding a job in the same sector if they are in
the formal sector. Since we do not have information on job mobility, we cannot analyze
the stability of jobs in the two sectors directly. Together with the descriptive statistics
on wage rates, these findings suggest that for the higher educated, formal sector employ-
ment has the characteristics of primary jobs, which are superior to jobs in the informal
sector. Informal sector jobs are held by those with low other family income, who cannot
afford not to work at all. This is in line with the staging hypothesis in the Fields (1975)
model. For men and women with low education levels, however, we find a very different
pattern, and there is no evidence that formal sector jobs are superior to informal sector
jobs. Thus for the low educated, the weakly competitive view of Magnac (1991) seems
more relevant.
Some limitation of our approach and directions for future research seem worth men-
tioning. The first is that our models are reduced form in the sense that wage rates are
not explicitly incorporated. An extension of the current model to a more structural
model in which potential wages in both sectors are modeled simultaneously with labor
market state, could be used to investigate the role of the wage differential between for-
mal and informal sector. The differences with education level which we find with the
current model, could very well reflect the impact of the wage differential in a more struc-
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tural model. A second limitation is the issue of migration. Temporary migration to the
U.S. is very common. See Martin (1999) for an extensive descriptive analysis. Whether
the quality of informal and formal sector employment affects this type of migration, is
obviously of great policy relevance for the U.S. as well as Mexico. Unfortunately how-
ever, we cannot use our panel data to take migration into account, since information on
temporary migrants is not available.
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Appendix:
Table A1. Variable explanations
Variables Explanation
Child Number of children younger than 6 years old
Adults Number of family members older than 11 years old
Age Age of the individual
Lowedu No education or primary school education(0-6 years)
Medu After primary but up to senior school education (7-12 years)
Hedu Univ. or vocational education after Senior school (12+ years)
Othinc Real incomes from other family members (in pesos of July, 1995)
JuaTij Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana
Guada Guadalajara
Mont. Monterrey
Mex. City Mexico City
Married Married persons
Nmar Single or divorced
T1 Time dummy: 1 if the first quarter
T2 Time dummy: 1 if the second quarter
T3 Time dummy: 1 if the third quarter
T4 Time dummy: 1 if the fourth quarter
T5 Time dummy: 1 if the fifth quarter
Form. formal sector workers
Infor. Informal sector workers
Noem. being not employed
Table A2. Sample Statistics
1st quarter of 92 4th quarter of 94
Variables Men Women Men Women
Child 0.720(0.87) 0.660(0.85) 1.716(0.84) 1.711(0.84)
Adults 3.347(1.74) 3.287(1.76) 4.166(1.53) 4.104(1.60)
Age 39.740(11.42) 38.670(12.13) 38.843(10.90) 37.503(11.72)
Lowedu 0.455(0.50) 0.554(0.50) 0.444(0.50) 0.530(0.50)
Medu 0.363(0.48) 0.375(0.48) 0.380(0.49) 0.391(0.49)
Hedu 0.182(0.39) 0.071(0.26) 0.176(0.38) 0.079(0.27)
Othinc 980.2(1657) 2373.1(2501) 1044.6(1719) 2524.2(3110)
JuaTij 0.298(0.35) 0.331(0.37) 0.277(0.35) 0.321(0.37)
Guada 0.178(0.38) 0.147(0.35) 0.136(0.34) 0.084(0.28)
Mont. 0.205(0.40) 0.211(0.41) 0.240(0.43) 0.261(0.44)
Mex. City 0.318(0.47) 0.311(0.46) 0.347(0.48) 0.334(0.47)
Married 0.940(0.24) 0.830(0.38) 0.943(0.23) 0.817(0.39)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table A3. Estimates of the static logit equation
the 1992 Panel the 1995 Panel
Men Women Men Women
Param. Info. Noem. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem. Infor. Noem.
πj :
Const. 3.031** 1.960 -2.895 8.541* 0.980 -0.923* -2.549 5.771
Age -0.223* -0.360* -0.105 -0.367* -0.096 -0.267* -0.001* -0.216*
Age2 0.003* 0.006* -0.001 0.005* 0.002 0.005* 0.002 0.004*
Child 0.098 -0.373 0.307 0.679* -0.152 -0.138 0.935* 0.735*
Adults 0.014 -0.070 0.354* 0.271 0.112 0.139 -0.084 -0.119
Medu -1.115* -0.384 -1.621* -1.382* -1.768* -0.426 -2.745* -1.805*
Hedu -3.491* -2.745* -3.586* -3.471* -2.927* -1.445* -4.044* -4.096*
Othinc -0.060 0.026 -0.217* -0.075 -0.062** 0.052 -0.058 0.012
JuaTij 0.084 0.244 -0.591 0.675** -0.401 -0.137 -1.082** -0.767*
Guada 0.485 0.273 0.985 0.526 1.053* 1.516* -0.599 -0.596
Mont. -0.690** -0.872 0.217 0.191 -0.352 -0.149 1.144* 0.660
Nmar -0.822 0.375 -0.737 -4.086* -0.060 1.485* -0.770 -3.802*
T2 0.176 0.108 0.053 -0.573 0.034 0.478 -0.170 -0.449
T3 -0.200 -0.581 0.664 0.676 0.999 0.434 -0.848* 0.705
T4 0.425 -0.852 0.657 0.667 0.832* 2.252* 1.206 0.506
Σθ :
ν22 15.040* 8.365* 14.021* 21.965*
ν23 6.831* 6.523* 5.212* 9.907*
ν23 6.400* 2.451 6.047* 10.655*
(1) * Significant at 5% level; ** significant at 10 % level.
(2) Reference group: formal sector workers.
(3) ν2j : variance of θij , j = 2, 3; ν23: covariance of θi2 and θi3.
(4) “Lowedu”, “T2”, and “Mex. City”, were left out as control group dummies.
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Table A4 and A5 are the equivalences of Table 2 and 3 in the text, but using Magnac’s
definition of the informality.
Table A4. Sample percentages of the labor market status
Quarter 92.1 92.2 92.3 92.4 93.1 94.4 95.1 95.2 95.3 95.4
Males
Formal 65.3 64.1 65.6 64.7 62.9 69.2 67.6 66.3 63.9 64.9
Informal 28.3 27.8 27.8 28.0 28.9 24.8 24.7 24.9 26.3 26.8
Nonempl. 6.4 8.2 6.6 7.3 8.1 5.9 7.7 8.8 9.8 8.4
Females
Formal 21.7 21.0 21.3 21.8 21.7 25.8 26.2 25.9 25.3 24.5
Informal 9.5 9.1 8.6 9.2 8.7 9.8 8.3 7.5 7.9 7.9
Nonempl. 68.8 70.0 70.1 69.0 69.6 64.4 65.5 66.6 66.7 67.6
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Table A5. Sample probabilities of transitions
t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
t− 1 Form. Infor. Noem. Form. Infor. Noem. Form. Infor. Noem. Form. Infor. Noem.
Men 92
Form. 0.855 0.103 0.042 0.865 0.111 0.024 0.861 0.108 0.032 0.859 0.113 0.029
Infor. 0.235 0.707 0.058 0.281 0.662 0.057 0.254 0.678 0.068 0.198 0.723 0.079
Noem. 0.186 0.186 0.629 0.225 0.225 0.550 0.253 0.187 0.560 0.211 0.155 0.634
Men 95
Form. 0.847 0.118 0.035 0.845 0.100 0.055 0.842 0.104 0.054 0.868 0.090 0.042
Infor. 0.295 0.622 0.083 0.263 0.655 0.082 0.250 0.675 0.075 0.264 0.678 0.057
Noem. 0.203 0.261 0.536 0.250 0.298 0.452 0.237 0.268 0.495 0.243 0.315 0.441
Women 92
Form. 0.750 0.048 0.202 0.814 0.045 0.141 0.772 0.071 0.156 0.806 0.053 0.141
Infor. 0.099 0.527 0.374 0.073 0.510 0.417 0.176 0.527 0.297 0.132 0.505 0.363
Noem. 0.035 0.050 0.915 0.042 0.047 0.911 0.049 0.044 0.908 0.045 0.039 0.915
Women 95
Form. 0.822 0.059 0.119 0.837 0.038 0.125 0.827 0.035 0.137 0.814 0.053 0.133
Infor. 0.165 0.485 0.350 0.097 0.570 0.333 0.123 0.494 0.383 0.123 0.543 0.333
Noem. 0.040 0.031 0.929 0.049 0.029 0.922 0.041 0.050 0.909 0.044 0.036 0.920
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Table A6. Estimates of the unrestricted model
(Men, 1992 panel)
Dynamic equation Static equation
Param. Info. Noem. Infor. Noem.
βj :
Const. -1.304 -2.037 2.659 2.229
Age -0.012 -0.160* -0.215* -0.385*
Age2 0.001 0.003* 0.003* 0.006*
Child 0.194 -0.158 0.144 -0.229
Adults -0.154* -0.002 -0.037 -0.030
Medu -0.980* -0.251 -1.126 -0.374
Hedu -2.993* -1.613* -3.428* -3.262*
Othinc -0.032 0.028 -0.052 -0.002
JuaTij 0.837* 0.845* 0.033 0.282
Guada 0.754* 0.927** 0.696 0.506
Mont. -0.162 0.499 -0.811** -0.803
Nmar -0.118 1.478* -0.758 0.276
T3 -0.140 -0.387 0.228 0.049
T4 -0.250 -0.263 -0.459 -0.927















(1) * Significant at 5% level; ** significant at 10 % level.
(2) Reference group: formal sector workers.
(3) σ2j = V ar(αij), j = 2, 3; σ23 = Cov(αi2, αi3).
(4) “Lowedu”, “T2”, “Mex. City”, and “Form.”, were
left out as control group dummies.
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Table A7. Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, higher education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(J2 | j1)
jt t = 1 t = 2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.797 0.783 0.944 0.047 0.009
(0.060) (0.047) (0.042) (0.032) (0.028)
Informal 0.198 0.200 0.145 0.814 0.041
(0.057) (0.051) (0.111) (0.172) (0.114)
Not-employed 0.005 0.017 0.336 0.322 0.342
(0.039) (0.041) (0.182) (0.182) (0.227)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table A8 Simulated Transition Probabilities
(Males, Lower education received)
Prob(jt) Prob(J2 | j1)
jt t = 1 t = 2 Formal Informal Not-employed
92.1
Formal 0.567 0.534 0.873 0.109 0.018
(0.044) (0.038) (0.053) (0.037) (0.038)
Informal 0.409 0.432 0.082 0.881 0.037
(0.045) (0.043) (0.040) (0.095) (0.078)
Not-employed 0.024 0.034 0.232 0.426 0.343
(0.043) (0.050) (0.146) (0.172) (0.209)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1. Comparison of the real log wages between the formal
sector and the informal sector (Males)
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Figure 2. Comparison of the real log wages between the formal
sector and the informal sector (Females)
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